ModSecurity is a popular open source tool originally designed as a module for Apache HTTP server for securing web applications. It is a web application firewall (WAF) mainly used for real-time web application monitoring, logging, and access control.

Why ModSecurity

There are two main aspects of ModSecurity which can be leveraged very effectively within Access Gateway. First, at its core, ModSecurity allows the admin to access HTTP stream in real-time, along with the ability to parse it. This is essential for real-time security monitoring. The second aspect is it allows continuous security assessment of both behaviors of the external parties, as well as the behavior of the system itself in the background. It’s sort of the first line of defense that can detect traces of many abnormalities and security weaknesses before they are exploited.

In this article, ModSecurity is being deployed as Apache module and therefore embedded to Access Gateway. So Access Gateway’s resources are shared by ModSecurity. More details are in a later part of this article.

What’s in this article

This article covers the following items in detail:

  • How to enable ModSecurity on Access Gateway
  • Install Open Web Application Security Project’s Core Rule Set
  • Configure ModSecurity Verbose/monitor Mode
  • Impact on performance

Rules and Core Rule Set(CRS) 3.x

ModSecurity is an engine which requires rules. Rules make it an extremely powerful and versatile engine to control HTTP request & response down to byte level. To utilize its power, ModSecurity provides a platform, a rule configuration language, known as ‘SecRules’ for real-time monitoring, logging, and filtering of HTTP communications based on rules.

ModSecurity is most commonly deployed to provide protection against generic classes of vulnerabilities using the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Core Rule Set (CRS). This is an open-source set of rules written in ModSecurity’s SecRules language. CRS aims to protect web applications from a wide range of attacks, including the OWASP Top Ten, with a minimum of false alerts. The Core Rule Set provides protection against many common attack categories, including:

  • SQL Injection (SQLi)
  • Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
  • Local File Inclusion (LFI)
  • Remote File Inclusion(RFI)
  • Remote Code Execution (RCE)
  • PHP Code Injection
  • HTTP Protocol violations
  • HTTPoxy
  • Shellshock
  • Session Fixation

How to install ModSecurity and CRS

The ModSecurity tarball has ModSecurity Apache module Ver 2.9.2 and OWASP’s Core Rule Set Ver 3.0.2.

Please follow the steps mentioned below to enable the ModSecurity module with CRS:

  1. Download the attached tarball and copy it to /etc/opt/novell/apache2/conf/
# cp ModSecurity.tar.gz /etc/opt/novell/apache2/conf/
# cd /etc/opt/novell/apache2/conf/
  1. Untar the tarball.
 # tar -zxvf ModSecurity.tar.gz
  1. There will be a new directory ModSecurity under /etc/opt/novell/apache2/conf/. Make copy of two new directories under /etc/opt/novell/apache2/conf/ as follows:
# cp -r ModSecurity/modsec.d  /etc/opt/novell/apache2/conf/
# cp -r ModSecurity/owasp-modsecurity-crs-3.0.2  /etc/opt/novell/apache2/conf/
  1. Create a symbolic link.
# ln -s owasp-modsecurity-crs-3.0.2 crs
  1. Remove unused files & folders.
# rm -r ModSecurity ModSecurity.tar.gz
  1. Copy modSecurity module to respective Apache directory.

For NAM 4.4.3

#cp ModSecurity/4.4.3/ /opt/novell/apache2/libexec/

For NAM 4.4.2

#cp ModSecurity/4.4.2/ /opt/novell/apache2/libexec/
  1. Open /etc/opt/novell/apache2/conf/httpd.conf.

Add the following line at the beginning of the LoadModule section of the httpd.conf file.

LoadModule security2_module libexec/

Uncomment the following line available in the same section.

LoadModule unique_id_module libexec/
  1. Add the following settings to the AG Global Advanced Option.
<IfModule security2_module>
  SecRuleEngine Off
  Include /etc/opt/novell/apache2/conf/modsec.d/modsecurity-base.conf
  Include /etc/opt/novell/apache2/conf/modsec.d/crs.conf
  1. Add the following setting to the Proxy Service’s Advanced option to enable ModSecurity Rule Engine with verbose mode.
<IfModule security2_module>
  SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly

There are a few configuration/directives which are critical for ModSecurity and CRS to work together as expected without giving any unwanted surprises.

The following section covers a few settings and its usage with a detailed description. README and conf files of both ModSecurity and CRS can also be used for reference.

Advanced configuration or settings

There is always some risks and impact when ModSecurity is enabled on a production environment. There are chances of false positive, blocking a legitimate user from accessing resources, performance degradation, etc. Chances are high when ModSecurity is deployed as Disruptive mode.

Following are a few generic and recommended settings which make ModSecurity less offensive and never blocks any request.

It’s verbose only mode where separate logs are created for any security threat detected.

There are few more settings to gauge the impact on performance and other server resources.

The configuration files (crs-setup.conf and modsecurity-base.conf are available inside path/etc/opt/novell/apache2/conf/ ) which are copied during installation steps mentioned above already have the following settings enabled.

Verbose mode

Setting ModSecurity rule engine to process rules but never to execute any disruptive actions (block, deny, drop, allow, proxy and redirect) is done by:

SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly

Note: The Admin can set it to On and play with additional settings like anomaly threshold, sampling percentage, etc., after the initial round of testing and performance impact analysis.

The logs generated by ModSecurity are dumped to a new file using:

SecDebugLog /var/log/novell-apache2/modsec_log

The verboseness of the debug log data is set as below

SecDebugLogLevel 3

Messages at levels 1-3 are always copied to the Apache error log. Therefore, admin can use level 0 as default logging level in production performance is very critical. Having said that, the best value to use is 3, since being ModSecurity at verbose mode, analyzing warnings & errors related to ModSecurity will be easier.

Anomaly score

CRS with Anomaly Scoring Mode is the default and recommended mode since it gives the most accurate log information and offers the most flexibility in setting blocking policies. In this mode, each matching rule increases an ‘anomaly score’. Each rule in the CRS has an associated severity level. These are the default scoring points for each severity level. These settings will be used to increment the anomaly score if a rule matches. These scores are cumulative. So it’s possible for a request to hit multiple rules.

In Anomaly Mode, there is also a Blocking Threshold Levels. This is the level upon reaching an inbound request or outbound response gets blocked. Blocking evaluation rules apply a disruptive action, ideally returning an error 403. It is a common practice to start a new CRS installation with elevated anomaly scoring thresholds (>100) and then lowers the limits as your confidence in the setup grows.

Current Anomaly Mode Blocking Threshold Levels for inbound request is set to 500 since the idea is not to block the request during the testing phase. In case a request is reaching 500, something really bad with the request or configuration error. Here are the current settings:

SecAction  "id:900100,  phase:1,  nolog,  pass,  t:none,  setvar:tx.critical_anomaly_score=5, \ setvar:tx.error_anomaly_score=4, setvar:tx.warning_anomaly_score=3, \ setvar:tx.notice_anomaly_score=2"

SecAction  "id:900110, phase:1, nolog,  pass, t:none, setvar:tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold=500, \ setvar:tx.outbound_anomaly_score_threshold=500"

Note: Anomaly setting with disruptive action is effective only when SecRuleEngine setting is set to On

Paranoia level

The Paranoia Level (PL) setting allows admin to choose the desired level of rule checks. With each paranoia level increase, the CRS enables additional rules giving you a higher level of security. However, higher paranoia levels also increase the possibility of blocking some legitimate traffic due to false alarms (false positive). A paranoia level of 1 is the default. In this level, most core rules are enabled. PL1 is advised for beginners, installations covering many different sites and applications, and for setups with standard security requirements. At PL1 false alarms are very rare. Here is the default setting

SecAction   "id:900000, phase:1, nolog, pass, t:none,   setvar:tx.paranoia_level=1"


Adding the Core Rule Set to an existing production site can lead to false positives, unexpected performance issues, and other undesired side effects. It can be beneficial to test the water first by enabling the CRS for a limited number of requests only and then, with growing confidence after fixing issues, raise the ratio of requests being sent into the ruleset. Adjust the percentage of requests that are funneled into the Core Rules by setting as below.

SecAction "id:900400,  phase:1,  pass,  nolog,  setvar:tx.sampling_percentage=25"

So with this only a quarter of total traffic will go through CRS.

Allowed HTTP methods

Currently, almost all HTTP methods are allowed as below.


This can be modified depending on the application AG is protecting.

Content Type

By default, the following content types are allowed in requests.

application/x-www-form-urlencoded, multipart/form-data, text/xml, application/xml, application/soap+xml, application/x-amf, application/json, application/octet-stream, text/plain, text/x-gwt-rpc

Here is the current setting.

SecAction  "id:900220,  phase:1,  nolog,  pass,  t:none,\ setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type=application/x-www-form-urlencoded|multipart/form-data|text/xml|application/xml|application/soap+xml|application/x-amf|application/json|application/octet-stream|text/plain|text/x-gwt-rpc'"

Protocol version

Allowed HTTP versions are HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0

SecAction  "id:900230,  phase:1,  nolog,  pass,  t:none,  setvar:'tx.allowed_http_versions=HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0'"

Forbidden file extensions

In a bid to Guards against unintended exposure of development/configuration files access to following extensions are restricted.

SecAction "id:900240, phase:1, nolog, pass, t:none, setvar:'tx.restricted_extensions=.asa/ .asax/ .ascx/ .axd/ .backup/ .bak/ .bat/ .cdx/ .cer/ .cfg/ .cmd/ .com/ .config/ .conf/ .cs/ .csproj/ .csr/ .dat/ .db/ .dbf/ .dll/ .dos/ .htr/ .htw/ .ida/ .idc/ .idq/ .inc/ .ini/ .key/ .licx/ .lnk/ .log/ .mdb/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .pol/ .printer/ .pwd/ .resources/ .resx/ .sql/ .sys/ .vb/ .vbs/ .vbproj/ .vsdisco/ .webinfo/ .xsd/ .xsx/'"

File system configuration

ModSecurity is required to store temporary files and some persistent data under the local file system. The current setting is set to /tmp using the following directive. However, /tmp is less than ideal and it is recommended to specify a location that’s private.

SecTmpDir /tmp/

SecDataDir /tmp/

How to analyze ModSecurity log files

Following are a few samples of logs generated when any threat is detected by ModSecurity using CRS:

[][rid#7fae48014ef0][/bajesh/HIMDEEP/modsec/aaa.html][2] Warning. detected XSS using libinjection. [file “/etc/opt/novell/apache2/conf/crs/rules/REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS.conf”] [line “64”] [id “941100”] [rev “2”] [msg “XSS Attack Detected via libinjection“] [data “Matched Data: via found within ARGS_NAMES:<SCRIPT>alert(\x5cxe2\x5cx80\x5cx9cCookie\x5cxe2\x5cx80\x5cx9d document.cookie)</SCRIPT>: <SCRIPT>alert(\x22Cookie\x22 document.cookie)</SCRIPT>”] [severity “CRITICAL”] [ver “OWASP_CRS/3.0.0”] [maturity “1”] [accuracy “9”] [tag “Default-Action2-ModSec”] [tag “application-multi”] [tag “language-multi”] [tag “platform-multi”] [tag “attack-xss”] [tag “OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS“] [tag “WASCTC/WASC-8”] [tag “WASCTC/WASC-22”] [tag “OWASP_TOP_10/A3”] [tag “OWASP_AppSensor/IE1”] [tag “CAPEC-242”]

[][rid#7fae48014ef0][/bajesh/HIMDEEP/modsec/aaa.html][2] Warning. Matched phrase “document.cookie” at ARGS_NAMES:<SCRIPT>alert(\xe2\x80\x9cCookie\xe2\x80\x9d document.cookie)</SCRIPT>. [file “/etc/opt/novell/apache2/conf/crs/rules/REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS.conf”] [line “303”] [id “941180”] [rev “2”] [msg “Node-Validator Blacklist Keywords“] [data “Matched Data: document.cookie found within ARGS_NAMES:<SCRIPT>alert(\x5cxe2\x5cx80\x5cx9cCookie\x5cxe2\x5cx80\x5cx9d document.cookie)</SCRIPT>: <script>alert(\x22cookie\x22 document.cookie)</script>”] [severity “CRITICAL”] [ver “OWASP_CRS/3.0.0”] [maturity “1”] [accuracy “8”] [tag “Default-Action2-ModSec”] [tag “application-multi”] [tag “language-multi”] [tag “platform-multi”] [tag “attack-xss”] [tag “OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS“] [tag “WASCTC/WASC-8”] [tag “WASCTC/WASC-22”] [tag “OWASP_TOP_10/A3”] [tag “OWASP_AppSensor/IE1”] [tag “CAPEC-242”]

[][rid#7fae48014ef0][/bajesh/HIMDEEP/modsec/aaa.html][2] Warning. Matched phrase “bin/bash” at ARGS:exec. [file “/etc/opt/novell/apache2/conf/crs/rules/REQUEST-932-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RCE.conf”] [line “448”] [id “932160”] [rev “1”] [msg “Remote Command Execution: Unix Shell Code Found“] [data “Matched Data: bin/bash found within ARGS:exec: /bin/bash”] [severity “CRITICAL”] [ver “OWASP_CRS/3.0.0”] [maturity “1”] [accuracy “8”] [tag “Default-Action2-ModSec”] [tag “application-multi”] [tag “language-shell”] [tag “platform-unix”] [tag “attack-rce”] [tag “OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/COMMAND_INJECTION“] [tag “WASCTC/WASC-31”] [tag “OWASP_TOP_10/A1”] [tag “PCI/6.5.2”]

[][rid#7fae4401f9c0][/bajesh/HIMDEEP/modsec/aaa.html][1] Access denied with code 400 (phase 2). Operator GE matched 5 at TX:anomaly_score. [file “/etc/opt/novell/apache2/conf/crs/rules/REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION.conf”] [line “57”] [id “949110”] [msg “Inbound Anomaly Score Exceeded (Total Score: 5)”] [severity “CRITICAL”] [tag “Default-Action2-ModSec”] [tag “application-multi”] [tag “language-multi”] [tag “platform-multi”] [tag “attack-generic”]

[][rid#7fae48004980][/bajesh/HIMDEEP/modsec/testpost.php][2] Warning. detected SQLi using libinjection with fingerprint ‘s&sos’ [file “/etc/opt/novell/apache2/conf/crs/rules/REQUEST-942-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SQLI.conf”] [line “68”] [id “942100”] [rev “1”] [msg “SQL Injection Attack Detected via libinjection“] [data “Matched Data: s&sos found within ARGS:username: 1′ or ‘1’ = ‘1”] [severity “CRITICAL”] [ver “OWASP_CRS/3.0.0”] [maturity “1”] [accuracy “8”] [tag “Default-Action2-ModSec”] [tag “application-multi”] [tag “language-multi”] [tag “platform-multi”] [tag “attack-sqli”] [tag “OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/SQL_INJECTION“] [tag “WASCTC/WASC-19”] [tag “OWASP_TOP_10/A1”] [tag “OWASP_AppSensor/CIE1”] [tag “PCI/6.5.2”]

As it is seen above, when ModSecurity detects any threat using CRS, messages with various information get appended to the log file set by SecDebugLog directive.

Analyzing these logs and searching for a specific string can let the admin know various attacks and severity levels that the server has gone through. As the first step, the following are the list of strings that can be looked for in debug log file:

  • URL Encoding Abuse Attack Attempt
  • Empty Host Header
  • HTTP Header Injection Attack via payload (CR/LF detected)
  • Remote Command Execution: Windows Command Injection
  • Request Missing a Host Header
  • XSS Filter – Category 4: Javascript URI Vector
  • Looking for basic sql injection. Common attack string for mysql, oracle and others.
  • Request content type is not allowed by policy
  • PHP Injection Attack: High-Risk PHP Function Name Found
  • Remote Command Execution: Windows Command Injection
  • Method is not allowed by policy
  • Invalid HTTP Request Line
  • SQL Injection Attack Detected via libinjection
  • HTTP protocol version is not allowed by policy
  • Remote Command Execution: Unix Command Injection
  • NoScript XSS InjectionChecker: Attribute Injection
  • IE XSS Filters – Attack Detected.
  • GET or HEAD Request with Body Content.
  • Remote Command Execution: Direct Unix Command Execution
  • PHP Injection Attack: Variables Found
  • PHP Injection Attack: High-Risk PHP Function Call Found
  • Node-Validator Blacklist Keywords
  • Invalid character in request (null character)
  • Remote Command Execution: Unix Shell Code Found
  • Possible Remote File Inclusion (RFI) Attack: Common RFI Vulnerable Parameter Name
  • Path Traversal Attack (/../)
  • URL file extension is restricted by policy
  • OS File Access Attempt
  • XSS Filter – Category 1: Script Tag Vector
  • XSS Attack Detected via libinjection
  • NoScript XSS InjectionChecker: HTML Injection
  • Path Traversal Attack (/../)
  • Possible Remote File Inclusion (RFI) Attack: URL Payload Used w/Trailing Question …
  • Found request filename/argument associated with security scanner

Performance Impact

Enabling ModSecurity definitely impacts on following areas of Access Gateway:

  • CPU Usage
  • Memory Usage
  • Response Time

The Admin can play around with the available directives and settings (sampling, anomaly threshold scor,e etc.) mentioned above and gauge the impact of ModSecurity on Access Gateway performance. A major impact is on Memory usage so increasing size of RAM is recommended. As CRS has around 200 rules, there will be a reduction in the number of simultaneous connections that Access Gateway can successfully handle if the available memory is not sufficient. Impact on CPU is between (1% – 5%).

What’s next

  • Performance benchmarking
  • Enabling detection of individual attacks. For e.g. XSS, SQLi, Brute-Force etc.
  • Geo-IP blacklisting, HTTP fingerprinting,
  • Handling false positives.
  • Many more…


  • ModSecurity 2.5 by Magnus Mischel
  • ModSecurity Handbook by


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Disclaimer: As with everything else at NetIQ Cool Solutions, this content is definitely not supported by NetIQ, so Customer Support will not be able to help you if it has any adverse effect on your environment.  It just worked for at least one person, and perhaps it will be useful for you too.  Be sure to test in a non-production environment.

Leave a Reply


  • geseg says:


    That’s exactly what I was evaluating. Thanks so much for a so detailed explanation and guidelines. Hoping for the next in the series.

    How about the maintainability in cases of changes in web console or upgrades of NAM version? It might have some configuration losses that you already spotted?

    • phimdeep says:

      As I mentioned, some configuration is done through admin console adv options (step 8 & 9) and rest are completely put in separate conf files. So in an ideal scenario of upgrade, these configurations should not get affected or overwritten.
      But what needed is ModSecurity library(.so) for corresponding NAM upgraded version.
      Currently, I added only for NAM 4.4.3 & 4.4.4.
      If any user wants to build own library, then a very minor code change is required.

By: phimdeep
Dec 11, 2018
3:40 pm
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